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ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR SOIL CONSERVATION: A DINAMIC GAME 
MODEL 
Abstract 
This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil 
productivity in presence of separation of property and control in agricultural land.  Using 
a dynamic model of contracts between the landlords and operators we analyze the 
incentives of different type of contracts (fixed rate contracts or sharecropping contracts) 
and their potential impact on soil conservation. The main research question of this paper 
is: do landlords and tenants have conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation? Our 
theoretical results are consistent with previous empirical literature that find that, 
depending on the contract specifications, there are no conflicting incentives. 
JEL codes classification: Q24, Q15, Q12 
 
Introduction 
This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil 
productivity in presence of separation of property and control in agricultural land.  Using 
a dynamic model of contracts between the landlords and operators we analyze the 
incentives of different type of contracts (fixed rate contracts or sharecropping contracts) 
and their potential impact on soil conservation. The main research question is: do 
landlords and tenants have conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation?  
This issue is important for the discussion on public policy regarding agricultural contracts 
and soil conservation. The standard economic analysis, based on the property rights and 
transaction costs approach, suggest that landlords are the residual claimants and have 
incentives for taking care of the natural resources whether they exploit it themselves or 
they grant it to a third person for the productive activity. 
The question that we analyze here is if landlords and tenants do have opposite incentives 
and how a contract can align incentives: On one hand incentives for preserving the 
resource productivity (landlord) and on the other incentives for overexploiting it (tenants) 
can be coordinated by a contract. First, we present a simple model that discuss which are 
the relevant variables in incentive alignment that will induce producers to protect the land 
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productivity. Second, we analyze information problems that can impede the incentive 
compatibility. 
This paper tries to formalize a practical problem to understand the incentives and factors 
that influence decisions. In the following section, we review the literature and we identify 
some relevant empirical findings. Then we present the theoretical model: a simple game 
theory model to understand the decision making process. We present a dynamic 
optimization model and determine theoretically which would be the soil nutrients stock 
in stationary status for the different type of contracts. Finally, we analyze the main results 
and predictions, and compare with other studies in theoretical and empirical literature. 
Final comments conclude.  
 
Literature review 
The subject on economic incentives for soil resource preservation has been approached 
from different perspectives; some authors have presented theoretical models for a better 
understanding of the problem, others have studied the empirical side, and some others 
have addressed both aspects. 
Lee (1980) worked with data gathered from the combination of the 1977 National 
Resources Inventory (NRI) carried out by the US Soil Conservation Service (SCS) and 
the 1978 Land Ownership Survey conducted by the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). In his study, Lee provides an idea of the land tenure impact on soil conservation. 
First of all, it is shown that corporations do not present average erosion rates higher than 
other landowners. At national level, and in most regions, there are no significant 
differences in erosion average rates as regards agricultural lands owned by different type 
of organizational units. Furthermore, with exception of the southeast region, there were 
no significant differences in the erosion average rates among different type of landowners, 
mainly due to management. 
For non-corporative landowners, the results of this analysis are generally consistent with 
previous studies on farm net income, though there were no significant differences found 
between erosion rates and tenure groups. However, it was found that farm net income 
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exercises more influence within the complete proprietor-operator tenure group than other 
tenure categories.  
Finally, this analysis shows that there are regional differences, at least as regards income 
and tenure variables.  Among five US regions which had presented erosion average rates 
in 5 ton/acre crops, income and tenure variables provided some sort of explanation for 
erosion differences in the northeast region, Corn Belt and Delta. However, there can be a 
more appropriate model for the Appalachia and Southeast region. Crop type 
characteristics in these regions, as well as landowners’ attitudes as regards conservation, 
can provide some sort of explanation. 
Burt (1981), through the approximately optimal decision rule approach which consists in 
a lineal approximation to the functional equation of dynamic programming in the 
“neighborhood” of the equilibrium state, shows that relatively high grain prices 
exacerbate soil erosion problems. However, empirical results for the Palouse suggest that 
wheat intensive production carried out with good cultural and fertilization practices is 
widely justified in the long term and for immediate net production as well. Additional 
topsoil and organic matter loss, compared to the use of a bigger amount of fodder in the 
cropping system, lies within economy boundaries and does not represent a threat for long 
term soil productivity. 
In sloping areas, problems have their own characteristics and there should be a specialized 
crop system to be used without causing technical inefficiencies in modern farms on a 
large scale. Unless there is a substantial increase in fodder price in relation to cereal crops, 
it seems these conclusions will prevail in the foreseeable future. Though the analysis was 
done taking a relative price too low for alfalfa hay, technological change has significantly 
increased wheat production, and this should probably be more than enough. Direct sowing 
cultural practices combined with modern herbicides grants greater credibility to this 
conclusion. 
 McConnell (1983) introduces soil depth and loss in a simple agricultural production 
model, trying to determine when the private path to erosion differs from the socially 
optimal path. He develops an economic model for optimal private and social land use 
where he focuses on the intertemporal path in land use, including conditions under which 
private and social optimum differ.  
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He reaches the following results: first of all, an increase in soil loss does not mean that 
farmers ignore production physical relationships. A second implication is that if farmers 
realize baseline soil affects farm resale value, they will try to preserve it. A third 
conclusion refers to land use policy, where requiring that the soil eliminated each year 
should not be more than the natural resupplying therefore it presents radical consequences 
for farming policies and practices. This conclusion derives from maximizing generation’s 
minimum welfare. 
Lee and Stewart (1983) used a logit model with data gathered through the combination 
of the National Resource Inventory (NRI) from 1977 and the Land Ownership Survey 
conducted by the US National Department of Agriculture; they were concentrated 
exclusively on farming lands1 and worked with 7649 observations of the fused sample 
which fulfilled the criteria, establishing a random sample of every non-federal farming 
unit population in the 48 states during 1977 and 1978.  
In their study they conclude that small size operations represent more of an obstacle for 
adopting minimum tillage than property detachment from farm operation. Differences 
would not confirm the usual hypothesis about the effect of property detachment and farm 
operation on soil conservation. In contrast, using minimum tillage is not so common 
among landowners who only operate on lands that they possess. Furthermore, though land 
leasing data was not included in this analysis, the authors consider that tenure impact was 
significant in every region, including those regions such as Corn Belt where percentage 
leasing is very common (moreover, there was not a significant interaction impact between 
tenure and the region). This suggests that leasing agreements do not alter the basic 
relationship between tenure and the use of minimum tillage.  
After considering land tenure classification and farm size, analysis indicates that in some 
regions minimum tillage is slightly more probable to be used in non-erosive lands than in 
erosive lands. Therefore, this suggests that soil conservation can become a secondary 
motivation in the use of minimum tillage.  
In his study, Pagiola (1999) establishes that decisions on land use are taken by farmers, 
not by social planners or government agencies. Farmers are the ones who decide how to 
                                                          




use their lands according to their own goals, possibilities and limitations. But they also 
take into account what society would like farmers to do. Even when society presents 
clearly articulated social goals, such as “sustainable development”, it becomes difficult 
to turn these goals into land individual user’s actions, particularly due to specific farming 
production site characteristics, soil degradation problems and the lack of data.  
Therefore, Pagiola concludes that farmers tend to have strong incentives for using 
conservation measures when soil degradation threatens their land`s long term 
productivity. When degradation becomes worrisome, mainly due to its impact on 
productivity, differences between optimal conservation behavior and socially optimal 
behavior are generally brought on by variation in products and supplies costs or by 
restrictions that prevent farmers from adopting conservation practices that would 
otherwise be profitable. Unless these problems are addressed directly, it is unlikely that 
any incentive model would turn out effective. On the contrary, when degradation becomes 
a problem due to its impact outside the land, farmers lack direct incentive for taking 
appropriate corrective measures. 
Allen and Lueck (2003) proposed that rental contracts for a percentage of the harvested 
crop discourage the use of the input since they affect the marginal product of the inputs. 
This is because part of the marginal product of the input is captured by the owner of the 
land through the amount received in rent, reducing the marginal product that the producer 
receives; that leads him to use a smaller amount of inputs. 
Gallacher (2004) finds out there are no a priori reasons to infer that a reduction in the 
percentage of owner controlled lands will necessarily lead to a lower conservation level. 
On the contrary, it is possible that land leasing could make resources allocation become 
more flexible and it could also facilitate an injection of capital for the agricultural sector, 
reducing producers funding costs and therefore lowering future income discount rates. 
On the other hand, he claims that land leasing allows businessmen with limited land areas 
to generate additional income by selling agricultural work and in this way help them 
reduce pressure to increase land use. 
Brescia and Lema (2004) worked with data from the Agricultural National Census (ANC- 
2002) for Pergamino County in Argentina and also with a survey to farmers carried out 
by INTA’s Project “FERTILIZAR”. Brescia and Lema (2006) also used microdata from 
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the Agricultural National Census (ANC - 2002) for Entre Rios Province. In both papers, 
results showed a lack of differential impact between landowners and tenant farmers as 
regards both adopting soil conservation practices and using productive agricultural inputs 
and methods as well. This would aim at promoting the hypothesis that both landowners 
who farm their land and tenant farmers have the same incentive for using similar soil 
conservation productive techniques.  
In a recent paper, Arora et al (2015), empirically address the effects of different land 
tenure systems. They conduct interviews and a survey to farmers and decision-makers in 
in the “Pampean” region of Argentina There were two main questions: whether land 
tenure has an influence on agribusiness decision-makers’ economic and social goals, and 
also if differences in goals based on land tenure reflect differences in agricultural or 
economic practices and attitudes towards the environment. The aim was to explore the 
distinction between farmer’s goals working on leased lands and in owned lands. In 
particular, the focus was on goals and decisions that impact on soil conservation. 
The survey results suggest that landowners present a long-term approach to their 
economic and social goals paying greater attention to their personal goals, while tenants 
focus on short term goals in order to ensure profit maximization and fulfill social 
obligations. These differences between landowners and tenants’ goals seem to influence 
land use, financial instruments use and environmental attitudes.  Tenants are more likely 
to grow soybean which needs a lower initial investment. It is also more probable that they 
use futures and options markets, use different options to manage price risk and worry less 
about environment problems. 
Since a great part of land is rented by those decision-makers who also owned lands, 
interviews were conducted in order to try to differentiate these people’s goals and 
motivation, taking into account if the land was owned or rented. The results show tenure 
impact on underlying intentions where the same person pays attention to how a particular 
action improves the long term value of the owned land. But it is also shown that they were 
more worried about increasing profits from a leased land. As a result, tenants prefer to 
grow soybean, which is a low investment crop and they frequently ignore conservation 
practices, such as crop rotation. Furthermore, this study suggests that though 85% of the 
leased land is renewed each year, operators ignore a possible long-term association with 
rented lands, and they concentrate on maximizing short term profits. According to the 
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authors, this creates a dilemma for tenants, who by taking a short-term perspective, ignore 
that in some point in the future they will have to face long term consequences of their 
actions which are not clearly perceived by the tenant or landowner. To explain this point, 
they refer to a sequential game between two people where a sort of “prisoner’s dilemma” 
exists because the current tenant and the future tenant, who are often the same person, 
maximize the lease terms, acting as if there were no chances for them to farm the land in 
the future. Thus, they create a situation where the additive impact of their rational actions 
over the course of time becomes “irrational” given that the game leads them to take the 
most profitable short-term solution that nevertheless, is not optimal in the long term.  
Finally, they conclude that not only tenants are not being rational in their approach as 
regards the land, but also that the land owners that do not take into account the 
consequences of soil degradation. 
Lema and Benito (2016) claim that landowners’ private decisions on agricultural soil are 
efficient and lead to optimal behaviors as regards asset value preservation, since it is 
supposed these decisions are made through the land market, where property rights are 
properly defined. They choose a dynamic optimization formal model which shows that if 
prices appropriately reflect resources opportunity costs, the key variables to ensure an 
efficient soil use include intertemporal discount rates, benefits and costs associated to 
land production and preservation as well as working-time horizon. A significant point 
shown in the study is that the decentralized solution proves to be optimum both for agents 
with an infinite horizon as well as for agents with a limited horizon, under an appropriate 
functioning of the market and assuming that there are no distortions derived from 
regulations or taxes.  
 
A Dynamic Game Model 
Arora et al (2015) present a two participants sequential game, where each player plays 
only one turn and where during the initial term the tenant “ignores” he will be the tenant 
in the second term. We use this basic scheme for the game. Our contribution is to modify 
the information setting, because in our opinion is not suitable to explain the real behavior 
in the land market. If the tenant is rational, even without complete information, he should 
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know or at least be able to estimate the probability of lease renewal (the % of probabilities 
of continuing exploiting the land) and he would play differently.  
The model we suggest is a sequential game repeated infinitely considering that there are 
doubts as regards when the game will end (during each term, we specifically added a 15% 
probability to end the game). During several game stages, players (both the landowner 
and the tenant being the same in each stage) complete a specific game (always the same 
one) called stage game. Results are shown at the end of each stage, and the players receive 
the corresponding payment.  
In order to simplify the analysis to set the game, we will assume that the profits are the 
same in each point of time. This is a game with incomplete information since the 
landowner payment capacity is unknown, and therefore there is uncertainty about when 
he is going to stop renting the land; but what is actually known is that there is 85% 
probability for the lease to be renewed being this one of the possible actions to be taken 
according to his strategic profile. Meanwhile, there is a 15% probability for the lease not 
to be renewed which would be the move that ends the game2.  
For his part, the tenant can take two actions: i) to exhaust the natural resource that grants 
him benefit 𝜋𝑠 or ii) to use the land according to the best agricultural practices expected 
by the landowner 𝜋𝑐. We assume that once the tenant starts to deplete the soil, he will not 
be able to stop until the soil is completely exhausted. This means that once he decides to 
overexploit, he will not be able to change and use a soil conservation practice. 
The extensive form of the game is: 
 
                                                          
2 We assume a probability of renewal of 85% following the Arora et al. (2015) paper.  
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When this game is infinitely repeated there are two possible optimal strategies (because 
we assumed there were only two payments constant over time): i) to always overexploit 
until the resource is depleted or ii) to perform good practices or “conservationist” 
practices. Beginning to deplete after behaving in a conservationist is as a strategy 
dominated bye by any of the other two strategies.  




  (i) 
Where: 
𝜆: land leasing renewal probability 
r: real interest rate 
n: number of periods land stays productive before becoming depleted, allowing a constant 
profit  𝜋𝑠 per period 











 (iii) (Appendix I) 
Table 1 presents the indifference ratios between depletion benefits and conservation 
benefits. This implies that for overexploiting the land in this game it is necessary that the 
depletion profits outweigh the conservation profits the number of times reported in the 
cells. 
Table 1. Indifference Ratio between depletion profits and conservation profits – 




We can see that the higher the interest rate and the longer the time period, the resource 
can be overexploited, the smaller is the difference between overexploitation and 
conservation benefits needed to deplete the soil.  
If the probability for contract renewal is 10% the results are modified as shown in Table 
2. 
Table 2. Indifference Ratio between depletion profits and conservation profits – 
Probability of renewal 10% 
 
If the probability of renewal is 50% the results are: 
Table 3. Indifference Ratio between depletion profits and conservation profits – 
Probability of renewal 50% 
 
If the renewal probability is 100%3: 
Table 4. Indifference Ratio between depletion profits and conservation profits – 
Probability of renewal 100% 
                                                          
3That the probability of renewing next year is 100% is different from being a contract for a longer term 
and is analyzing the comparison from one year to another. 
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 1
1 6.3125 5.2500 4.4000 3.1250 2.3077 1.7391
5 1.7306 1.5329 1.3803 1.1701 1.0621 1.0141
10 1.2169 1.1375 1.0821 1.0216 1.0034 1.0002
25 1.0136 1.0051 1.0016 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 1
1 1.1099 1.1053 1.1000 1.0870 1.0714 1.0526
5 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
10 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
25 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 1
1 1.9804 1.9091 1.8333 1.6667 1.5000 1.3333
5 1.0306 1.0251 1.0198 1.0103 1.0041 1.0010
10 1.0009 1.0006 1.0004 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000




As expected, as probability of contract renewal increases, there is also an increase in the 
indifference profit ratio required for depleting the soil. If the contracts are set for a longer 
period of time, we find out that the game remains the same, a sequential game repeated 
endlessly. 
The profits of both, depletion and conservation arise from the sum of annual benefits 
minus cost increase4, multiplied the length of the contract5 and the total benefits would 
be the aggregation of one these two actions: overexploiting or conservation. A change of 
strategy would be irrational. Since this problem is solved by backward induction, what is 
decided in the last period will determine the actions in previous periods.  
Therefore, the game payoffs could be defined as following: 
1. Benefits of land depletion throughout the whole lease: 
𝜋𝑠




2. Benefits of conservation throughout the whole lease: 
𝜋𝑐




Where this represents leasing length and C represents annual rent cost increase (if C is 
greater than 0) or reduction (if C is less than 0) due to long term lease. 
We can redefine the game to consider long term contracts. The present value of profits 
from soil depletion are: 
                                                          
4 It takes into account rent price raising o reduction, transaction costs, etc. This variable may take 
negative or positive value as applicable. 
5 We suppose that contract length is going to be a dividing number of the number of years that the 
resource lasts, so as to simplify the process in the model 
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 1
1 101.0000 21.0000 11.0000 5.0000 3.0000 2.0000
5 20.6040 4.6195 2.6380 1.4874 1.1517 1.0323
10 10.5582 2.5901 1.6275 1.1203 1.0176 1.0010








Where 𝛿  represents the probability for leasing renewal,  𝑗 = 𝑛/𝑖: represents the number 
of years during land stays productive, before depletion, and profits are  𝜋𝑠
𝐶𝑙𝑝  for each 
contract. 
𝑘 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑖 − 1  represents discount rates used for evaluating the contracts.  













This way we can calculate what should be the difference as regards renewal probabilities 










(ix) (See Appendix 2) 
Through this equation we can conclude that the longer the contract length, the fewer 
renewal probabilities needed for the contract to become more convenient than one year 
contracts with resource conservation goals.  
Below, Tables 5, 6,7 and 8 presents different variations of costs (C) associated to long 
term leasing contracts. We presents the results for the minimum renewal probability 
needed for a 5-year contract to be more convenient or the same than a 1-year contract 
with 85% renewal probability in order to induce soil conservation practices. 




Table 6. Cost Variation: 0%.  
 
Table 7. Cost Variation: +25%.  
 
Table 8. Cost Variation: +50%.  
 
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.5 1
7 0.404012 0.400447 0.397339 0.395213 0.393729 0.390399 0.389642
8 0.406664 0.403721 0.401254 0.399638 0.398555 0.396358 0.395963
10 0.411199 0.409188 0.407632 0.406698 0.406123 0.405161 0.405052
15 0.419303 0.418522 0.418029 0.417792 0.417674 0.417547 0.417543
18 0.422673 0.422230 0.421982 0.421878 0.421833 0.421794 0.421793
21 0.425308 0.425056 0.424931 0.424886 0.424868 0.424856 0.424856
25 0.428009 0.427890 0.427840 0.427825 0.427820 0.427817 0.427817
28 0.429594 0.429526 0.429501 0.429495 0.429493 0.429492 0.429492
50 0.435690 0.435689 0.435689 0.435689 0.435689 0.435689 0.435689
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.5 1
7 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
8 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
10 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
15 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
18 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
21 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
25 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
28 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
50 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053 0.4437053
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.5 1
7 0.5091710 0.5171661 0.5245369 0.5298080 0.5336059 0.5425035 0.5446001
8 0.5050310 0.5116666 0.5175078 0.5214817 0.5242123 0.5299331 0.5309884
10 0.4977739 0.5023278 0.5059857 0.5082411 0.5096530 0.5120555 0.5123303
15 0.4843450 0.4861019 0.4872314 0.4877797 0.4880536 0.4883501 0.4883607
18 0.4786408 0.4796305 0.4801893 0.4804250 0.4805281 0.4806162 0.4806178
21 0.4741597 0.4747174 0.4749945 0.4750963 0.4751353 0.4751620 0.4751623
25 0.4695642 0.4698243 0.4699335 0.4699669 0.4699776 0.4699832 0.4699832
28 0.4668730 0.4670200 0.4670745 0.4670890 0.4670931 0.4670949 0.4670949
50 0.4566526 0.4566549 0.4566553 0.4566553 0.4566553 0.4566553 0.4566553
n\r 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.5 1
7 0.6038996 0.6287042 0.6529377 0.6711463 0.6847539 0.7183724 0.7266748
8 0.5947215 0.6155941 0.6349760 0.6487488 0.6585063 0.6797789 0.6838323
10 0.5780894 0.5926976 0.6049548 0.6127614 0.6177498 0.6264256 0.6274338
15 0.5456772 0.5514161 0.5551903 0.5570474 0.5579811 0.5589965 0.5590332
18 0.5313998 0.5346314 0.5364826 0.5372696 0.5376148 0.5379101 0.5379155
21 0.5200444 0.5218586 0.5227681 0.5231035 0.5232321 0.5233205 0.5233213
25 0.5083275 0.5091674 0.5095219 0.5096303 0.5096652 0.5096835 0.5096836
28 0.5014557 0.5019279 0.5021035 0.5021502 0.5021634 0.5021691 0.5021691
50 0.4755430 0.4755504 0.4755515 0.4755516 0.4755516 0.4755516 0.4755516
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These figures show that as long as there is an increase in costs associated to long-term 
contracts (in this case, 5 years),  there must be a higher renewal probability to sustain the 
equilibrium with an indifference 85% probability of short term renewal contract. 
Dynamic Model and Optimal Trajectory:  
We introduce in the model the use of fertilizers. We assume:  
Assumptions: 
 1  output 
 2 inputs { 𝑓𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡} 
 nutrients in the soil (stock) 𝑓𝑇
𝑡
 
 Production function: 𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡) 
 Cost function:𝑐𝑞 ∗ 𝑞𝑡 + 𝑐𝑓 ∗ 𝑓𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡 
𝐴𝑡 land rent 
 The transition function of the nutrient stock in the soil: 
𝑓𝑇
𝑡
̇ = 𝑓𝑡 − 𝛾 ∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡)] 
𝛾 Represents the net balance of nutrients obtained from the product (crop) 






𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡) − 𝑐𝑞 ∗ 𝑞𝑡 − 𝑐𝑓 ∗ 𝑓𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡) 
  Subject to: 𝑓𝑇
𝑡
̇ = 𝑓𝑡 − 𝛾 ∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡)] 
𝜌𝑖 = ln(1 + 𝑟) − ln𝜓 
0 < 𝜌𝑖 < 1 
Where ψ is the probability of renewal of the lease and r is the annual real interest rate. 𝜌𝑖 
is the discount rate for the type of tenure i.  
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We present 3 alternatives:  
1. a tenant who pays a fixed rent 
2. a tenant who pays a percentage of the crop harvested (sharecropping) 
3. the landlord operates the farm 
 
1. Fixed rent 
𝐻 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡) − 𝑐𝑞 ∗ 𝑞𝑡 − 𝑐𝑓 ∗ 𝑓𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 ∗ [𝑓𝑡 − 𝛾
∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡)]] 
𝜆𝑡 is the shadow price of the unit of the nutrient stock on the soil 






⁄ − 𝑐𝑞 − 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝛾 ∗
𝜙𝑞
𝑞𝑡













⁄ ] = 0  (2) 
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝜆
= 𝑓𝑡 − 𝛾 ∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡)] = 𝑓𝑇𝑡













⁄ = 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝜌𝑖 − 𝜆?̇? (4) 
For fixed rent contract, the variable 𝐴𝑡 is not present in the FOC´s, so the solution for the 
tenant and the landlord operator are practically the same. The difference is in the value 
that takes 𝜌𝑖 given that in the case of the owner-producer ψ = 1 and in the case of the 
tenant ψ <1. 
From (1) and (2) we obtain the optimal input levels 
(1 − 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝛾) ∗
𝜙𝑞
𝑐𝑞⁄ = 𝑞𝑡  (1’) 
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= 𝑓𝑡  (2’) 
Using (3) and (4) and replacing in  (1 ') and (2'): 








− 𝛾 ∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln (
𝜙𝑓∗(1−𝜆𝑡∗𝛾)
(𝑐𝑓−𝜆𝑡)









































If the rent is payed as a percentage of the production (α): 
𝐻 = (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝜙0 + (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡) − 𝑐𝑞 ∗ 𝑞𝑡
− 𝑐𝑓 ∗ 𝑓𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 ∗ [𝑓𝑡 − 𝛾 ∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡)]] 
The FOC´s are: 
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑞𝑡
= (1 − 𝛼) ∗
𝜙𝑞
𝑞𝑡
⁄ − 𝑐𝑞 − 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝛾 ∗
𝜙𝑞
𝑞𝑡
⁄ = 0  (9) 
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑓𝑡










⁄ ] = 0  (10) 
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝜆
= 𝑓𝑡 − 𝛾 ∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln(𝑓
𝑇
𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑡) + 𝜙𝑞 ∗ ln(𝑞𝑡)] = 𝑓𝑇𝑡















⁄ = 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝜌𝑖 − 𝜆?̇? (12) 
From (9) and (10) the optimal input levels are:  
(1 − 𝛼 − 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝛾) ∗
𝜙𝑞
𝑐𝑞⁄ = 𝑞𝑡  (9’) 





= 𝑓𝑡  (10’) 
Using (11) and (12) and replacing in (9 ') and (10': 








− 𝛾 ∗ [𝜙0 + 𝜙𝑓 ∗ ln (
𝜙𝑓∗(1−𝛼−𝜆𝑡∗𝛾)
(𝑐𝑓−𝜆𝑡)








































The steady state obtained in (16) is different from that obtained in (8) for equal renewal 
probability rates6, and the difference is entirely attributable to using a sharecropping 
contract, since this reduces the marginal income obtained by increasing the inputs.  
The steady state with a sharecropping contract will then be lower when the following 
condition is met: 
                                                          
6The probability of exogenous renewal is assumed for simplicity to make the comparison simpler; in the 

















Next, characterize the system of differential equations of first order in the neighborhood 
of the steady state. Since the models are similar, we take the case of the sharecropping 
contract. To obtain the results for fixed rent contracts is straightforward turning the α 
equal to zero. 









(1 + 𝜌𝐼) 0























The Trace is:𝜌𝐼 > 0 
The determinant is:−1 − 𝜌𝐼 < 0 
The discriminant is:𝜌𝐼
2 + 4 ∗ (1 + 𝜌𝐼) > 0 
Since the determinant is negative, the system is a saddle point. The relevant point is in 
𝑓𝑇
𝑡




Regarding the variation of the steady state with respect to the discount rate (relevant 
variable, that can be consider endogenous to the probability of contract renewal), we can 
say that the higher the discount rate, the lower the shadow price in the Steady State, and 
lower will be the steady state nutrient stock. 
Figure 1 presents the phase diagram that describes the time path of the nutrient stock 
(horizontal axis) and the shadow price of nutrient stock (vertical axis) 





The results of the model show that for 1% or 5% actual interest rates, and if the soil allows 
a 5 year overexploitation, with 85% renewal option, it is required that depletion profits 
become 73% and 53% higher than conservation benefits to be convenient. On the other 
hand, if the resource can be exploited over a 10-year period, it is necessary for each year 
to show 21% and 13% higher benefits, as regards conservation benefits to decide 
depleting the soil.  
Moreover, the model allows us to analyze the renewal probability for a long-term leasing 
contract to be superior to a short-term contract as regards land conservation. Comparing 
a 5-year-contract, where the resource may be exploited for 10 years, and a 1-year-contract 
with 85% renewal option, with 1% and 5% real interest rates, we can notice that long-
term contracts’ product costs variation appears as the relevant variable to be taken into 
account when defining renewal probability. 
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If cost falls 20%, the long-term contract renewal probability must be 41% for both interest 
rates. While if costs rise 50%, the required renewal probability would be 57% for a 1% 
discount rate and 59% for a 5% discount rate. 
This suggests that a long-term contract is not always better than a short-term one, since it 
depends on costs associated to the contract duration, and long-term renewal probability. 
A basic result of this model is that if the contract have zero renewal probability, the tenant 
would overexploit the land. Profit maximization leads to land overexploitation in order to 
reach the end of the contract leaving an unproductive land.  
As regards empirical implications, the theoretical results presented in this study questions 
whether land resource can be overexploited systematically due to the land tenure system. 
In a recent study Alvares et al. (2015) found out widespread soil damage due to the 
agricultural practices performed during the twentieth century in the Pampean prairie in 
Argentina. But, soil quality changes for the most part do not reach critical values. They 
compare soil carbon content between 1960 and 1980 and the present day, and they do not 
find significant regional changes.  
Therefore, this suggests that during the last decades, soil total organic matter in the 
Pampas has not significantly changed. On the other hand, they found evidence that 
nitrogen and phosphorus balances, which result from the difference between nutrients 
balance, are now as negative as they have always been historically in this region. 
However, this is not explicitly related to the type of land tenure system or to lease contract 
duration. If it is analyzed using the dynamic optimization model proposed above, the 
nitrogen and phosphorus balances that are currently negative can be thought of as not 
having reached the steady state values. 
 
Final Comments 
This paper developed a theoretical model to study the relationship with land tenure and 
soil conservation. Results suggest that practices related to soil conservation for different 
contracts between landowners and tenants will depend on: 
i. Interest rate: the higher the interest rate, the bigger the incentive to deplete the resource.  
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ii. Number of periods during which the resource can be overexploited until it is depleted: 
the larger the number of periods for overexploiting the resource, the more incentives there 
will be for not preserving the resource. 
iii. Contract renewal probability: the smaller the renewal probability, the more incentives 
there will be for overexploiting the resource.  
iv. Differences between overexploitation and conservationist practices profits.  
As regards incentives for protecting land nutrients stock, the dynamic model shows that 
there may be differences among tenure types.  Steady state conditions for the different 
kind of contracts may differ according to two variables: 
 Discount rates: it depends on the interest rate perceived by the agent (landowners and 
tenants) and contract renewal probability as regards the tenants.  
 Harvest percentage received by landowners in the case of sharecropping (which is zero if 
it is a fixed lease or if the land is exploited by the landowner).  
Finally regarding the main research question of this paper: do landlords and tenants have 
conflicting incentives regarding soil conservation? Our theoretical results are consistent 
with previous empirical literature that find that, depending on the contract specifications, 
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Appendix I  (equation ii) 
𝜋𝑠 ∗
𝜆 ∗ (1 + 𝑟)𝑛 − 𝜆𝑛+1
(1 + 𝑟 − 𝜆) ∗ (1 + 𝑟)𝑛
≥ 𝜋𝑐 ∗
𝜆






(1 + 𝑟 − 𝜆)
∗
(1 + 𝑟 − 𝜆) ∗ (1 + 𝑟)𝑛





𝜆 ∗ (1 + 𝑟)𝑛





𝜆 ∗ (1 + 𝑟)𝑛






(1 + 𝑟)𝑛 − 𝜆𝑛
 
 
Appendix II  (equation 7) 
assuming 𝜋𝑐 = 1 





(1 + 𝑘)𝑗 − 𝛿𝑗
 




(1 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑖 − 1)
𝑗





∗ 1 − 𝐶
((1 + 𝑟)𝑖)𝑗 − 𝛿𝑗
+ 𝐶 
𝜋𝑠 ≥
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛 ∗ (1 − 𝐶)




The condition of indifference between long-term contracts and one-year term is 
estimated: 
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛 ∗ (1 − 𝐶)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛 − 𝛿𝑗
+ 𝐶 ≥
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛 − 𝜆𝑛
 
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛 − 𝛿𝑗 ∗ 𝐶














+ 1) 𝛿𝑗 ≥ 𝜆𝑛 
𝛿𝑗−1 ≥
𝜆𝑛
−𝐶 +
𝜆𝑛∗𝐶
(1+𝑟)𝑛
+ 1
 
𝛿 ≥ (
𝜆𝑛
−𝐶 +
𝜆𝑛∗𝐶
(1+𝑟)𝑛
+ 1
)
1
𝑗
 
